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FOREWORD

Dr. Max Manwaring wrote this monograph in response
to the fact that today over half the countries in the global
community are faced with one variation or another of
asymmetric guerrilla war. Insurgencies, internal wars, and
other small-scale contingencies (SSCs) are the most
pervasive and likely type of conflict in the post-Cold War
era. That the United States will become involved directly or
indirectly in some of these conflicts is almost certain. The
Balkans, Colombia, Mexico, Somalia, and the Philippines
are only a few cases in point. Yet, little or no recognition and
application of the strategic-level lessons of the Vietnam War
and the hundreds of other smaller conflicts that have taken
place over the past several years are evident.
The purpose of this monograph is not to find fault or
identify villains. It is to draw from the lessons of the recent
past to better prepare today’s civilian and military leaders
to meet the unconventional and asymmetric warfare
challenges that face the United States and the rest of the
international community. This country is in a new global
security environment that involves the integration of free
markets, technologies, and countries to a degree never
before witnessed. The growling, nuclear-armed Soviet bear
was relatively easy to understand and deal with. The many
“smaller” threats—and benefits—that stem from global
integration are not easy to understand and respond to. Yet,
as the country that benefits most from global integration,
the United States has a pressing national interest in
maintaining and enhancing the new order. By coming to
grips analytically with the most salient strategic lessons or
rules that dominate contemporary SSCs, political and
military leaders can maximize opportunities in the current
and future chaos.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this
monograph, the second of our “Studies in Asymmetry,” as
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part of the ongoing refinement of our nation’s
understanding of the strategic risks and opportunities
arising from asymmetry.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY

The end of the Cold War did not produce an end to
internal or regional conflict and the expected peace
dividend. Today, over half the countries in the international
community are faced with one variation or another of
asymmetric small (i.e., guerrilla) wars. Insurgencies,
internal wars, and other small-scale contingencies (SSCs)
are the most pervasive and likely type of conflict in the new
world order. It is almost certain that, sooner or later, the
United States will become involved, directly or indirectly, in
many of these conflicts. It is also certain that the deplorable
experience of Vietnam distorts and blurs American
thinking about guerrilla insurgency. As a result, there
appears to be little or no recognition and application of the
strategic-level lessons of the Vietnam War and the
hundreds of other smaller conflicts that have taken place
over the past several years.
These lessons are not being lost on the new political
actors emerging into the contemporary multi-polar global
security arena. Ironically, strategies being developed to
protect or further the interests of a number of new players
on the international scene are inspired by the dual idea of
evading and frustrating superior conventional military
force within the global chaos. The better a power such as the
United States becomes at the operational level of
conventional war, the more a potential opponent turns to
asymmetric solutions. Thus, the purpose of this monograph
is to draw from the lessons of the recent past to better
prepare today’s civilian and military leaders for the
unconventional and asymmetric warfare challenges that
face the United States and the rest of the global community.
To help leaders come to grips analytically with the most
salient strategic lessons and rules that dominate
contemporary asymmetry, we do four things. First, we
clarify the strategic lessons of Vietnam. These lessons
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provide a short list of fundamental rules for dealing with
contemporary conflict. Second, with this as background, we
develop lessons from several other guerrilla wars that have
taken place since the end of World War II. The
complementary lessons from 69 additional cases
demonstrate important “intermediate” rules for playing in
the contemporary global security arena. Third, we examine
the future of guerrilla war. This examination includes an
analysis of the signposts along the road to the 21st century
and concludes that the hard-learned lessons of the past
remain valid. Finally, we outline two “advanced” structural
rules for generating strategic clarity and success in current
and future conflict. All this, hopefully, will generate the
broad strategic vision necessary to win a war—not just the
battles, but the war itself.
The Fundamental Strategic Lessons of Vietnam:
Relearning from the Theory and Experience
of the Past.
If the lessons of Vietnam teach anything, they teach the
need to go back to basics. The fact that the U.S. armed forces
were never defeated on the Vietnam battlefield obscures
another important fact of that war. Although American
forces never lost a battle, in the end it was the Vietcong and
their North Vietnamese allies who achieved their strategic
objectives and emerged victorious. Americans thought they
were fighting a limited war of attrition against a traditional
enemy—dressed in black pajamas. The threat the South
Vietnamese government and the United States had to deal
with was not a limited or a traditional one. Rather, the
Vietcong—on another level, and dressed in their comical
black pajamas—were making unconventional preparations
to take control of the state.
This reality takes us back to where we began. It takes us
to the question: “How could the United States have won all
the battles in Vietnam, but lose the war?” The answer is
straight-forward. American leadership failed to apply the
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fundamental principles of military theory and grand
strategy in that conflict. More specifically:
• The assessment of the nature of the conflict was
incorrect.
• The strategic environment within which the war was
taking place was misunderstood or ignored.
• The primary centers of gravity were not carefully or
continually assessed, prioritized, or considered in
nonmilitary (e.g., socio-political) terms.
• There was no appreciation of the centrality of rectitude
and moral legitimacy in supporting the counter-guerrilla
effort.
• These fundamental principles were not brought
together and put into a strategic paradigm through which to
understand and conduct the war.
The central unifying theme of these lessons is decisive.
The instruments of national power must be organized,
trained, and equipped within prescribed budgetary
considerations. But, those actions must be preceded with
clear, holistic, and logical policy direction—and the
structure, roles, missions, and strategy that will ensure the
achievement of the political ends established in that policy.
This is a fundamental “rule” that is as valid for current and
future conflict as it has been in the past.
Lessons from 69 Post-World War II Internal Wars:
Intermediate “Rules” for Playing
in the Contemporary Global Security Arena.
In the mid-1980s practitioners and academics deemed it
important to begin to face the so-called Vietnam syndrome
and try to understand the variables that make the
difference between wining and losing asymmetric guerrilla
wars. The intent was to improve prospects for success in
contemporary and future internal conflict situations and to
do a better job of protecting and advancing U.S. national
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interests in the developing global instability. One such
effort, never widely publicized, was initiated in 1984 by then
Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army General Maxwell
Thurman.
The results of most of the mandated research are
available at the National Security Archives in Washington,
DC. There is nothing really startling or radical about them.
The results suggest basic security strategy and national and
international asset management. Importantly, however,
the research points out that no successful strategy, on either
side of the conflict spectrum, has been formulated over the
past 50 years that has not explicitly or implicitly taken into
account all the following strategic dimensions—or wars
within the general internal war. They are:
• A “legitimacy war” to attack or defend the moral right
of an incumbent regime to exist.
• A more traditional police-military “shooting war”
between belligerents.
• “Wars” to isolate belligerents from their internal
and/or external support.
• A closely related “war to stay the course”—that is, the
effort to provide consistent and long-term support to an ally.
• Intelligence and information “wars.”
• “Wars” to unify multilateral, multidimensional, and
multi-organizational elements into a single effective effort.
It is important to note that the application of these
dynamic elements in a successful grand strategy subsumes
a realistic strategic vision and policy that is based on the
fundamental principles discussed in the previous section.
The Future of Asymmetric Internal Wars: Some
Signposts on the Road Ahead.
Even though prudent armies must prepare for high risk
low-probability conventional war, there is a high probability
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that the President and Congress of the United States will
continue to require military participation in small internal
guerrilla wars well into the future. These wars will likely
have new names, new motives, and new levels of violence
that will be a new part of the old problem. Nevertheless,
whether they are called “Teapot wars,” “Camouflaged
wars,” “Unrestricted wars,” “Operations Other Than War,”
or something else, future guerrilla wars can be identified by
the lowest common denominator of motive. And, as a
corollary, whether they are considered “spiritual
insurgencies,” “commercial insurgencies,” or anything else,
guerrillas wars are the organized application of violent or
nonmilitary coercion or threatened coercion intended to
resist, oppose, change, or overthrow an existing
government, and to bring about political change.
It is daunting and sometimes overwhelming to think of
the implications for guerrillas, or other self-appointed
saviors, who might employ nuclear, chemical, biological,
electronic, and informational weapons to attain their
objectives. Thus, although present and future asymmetric
conflicts may have different trappings, it is imperative to
remember the lessons of the past. The continuing relevance
of relatively recent experience can be seen in ongoing
conflicts. That is:
• Moral legitimacy remains the most important
principle of the post-World War II era. It can been seen, as
examples, in the Kurdish problem in Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and
Russia from at least 1961 to the present; Sierra Leone since
1991; the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria since 1992; and
in Chechnya since 1999.
• Appropriate use of military force is still a key element
in determining success or failure of counterguerrilla wars.
Importantly, the irrelevance of heavy Russian military
equipment and conventional training can be seen in the
Peruvian effort against the Sendero Luminoso, and in the
Ethiopian case.
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• The logical need to isolate belligerents from sources of
support is obvious in any number of contemporary cases.
Two contemporary examples are Colombia and Chechnya.
In Colombia, the insurgent alliance formed with
narco-traffickers is providing generous financial assistance
in return for protection of narcotics operations. In
Chechnya—and earlier in Afghanistan—the war against
Russian domination would be impossible without
substantial outside aid from state and nonstate political
actors.
• In this connection, the need to “stay the course”
remains constant. Without outside aid and internal
support, the Irish Republican Army could not function
effectively in Northern Ireland. Likewise, the Middle
Eastern Kurds would be unable to carry on their campaigns
for national liberation.
• Intelligence and information are more vital than ever
to the success or failure of contemporary guerrilla war.
Some argue, for example, that the failure of the stability
operations in Somalia was due in large part to a failure of
the United States and United Nations (U.N.) to develop
adequate and timely human intelligence. On the other
hand, and as only one example, information campaigns
have been key to the success of the Zapatista insurgency in
Mexico.
• Unity of Effort is the last principle that will be noted
here. Suffice it to say that the many problems of the U.N.
operation in the Congo (UNOC), the U.N. operation in
Somalia (UNOSOM II), the U.N. operations in the former
Yugoslavia, and the NATO operations in Bosnia and Kosovo
stem from a lack of unity of effort among the various
players.
As in the past, to the extent that these factors or
dimensions are strongly present in any given strategy, they
favor success. To the extent that any one is absent, or only
present in a weak form, the probability of success is
minimal.
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Two Advanced Structural “Rules” for Success
in the Global Security Arena.
Two characteristics of asymmetric guerrilla threats
have been identified as particularly significant. First,
defense planners today cannot know precisely what sort of
threats will emerge and what types will prove effective.
Second, the effectiveness of asymmetric threats that have
an impact will sooner or later decline as an enemy adjusts.
Some argue that by maximizing conceptual and
organizational adaptability and flexibility, the United
States can assure that it will rapidly counter emerging
asymmetric threats, and speed the process by which a
threat becomes insignificant or ineffective. Phrased
differently, in a time of strategic fluidity and asymmetry
like the current one, the political actor that develops new
concepts and concomitant leader judgment—and unifying
organizational structure—better and more quickly than an
opponent will have a decided advantage.
Given today’s realities, failure to prepare adequately for
small war (i.e., guerrilla) contingencies is unconscionable.
At a minimum, there are two basic cultural and organizational imperatives. They are:
• Leader Judgment. In that context, there are several
fundamental educational and cultural requirements to
modify Cold War mind-sets and to develop the leader
judgment that is needed to deal effectively with ambiguous,
complex, politically dominated, multidimensional,
multi-organizational, multinational, and multicultural
internal war situations. The study of conventional war has
always been considered to be essential preparation for
leaders involved in war. The study of “unconventional”
asymmetric war is no less essential.
• Unity of Effort. Operations at any level will achieve
strategic clarity and maximum effectiveness as a result of
integrating both horizontal and vertical planning and
implementation processes from the outset. That is,
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integrating horizontal (i.e., multinational) politicalmilitary planning and operations with vertical national
(e.g., U.S. interagency) political-military planning and
operations achieves a synergy toward the achievement of an
agreed political vision. These are two fundamental
organizational mechanisms necessary to help eliminate
“strategic ambiguity,” “ad-hoc-ery,” and “mission-creep.”
Conclusions.
These are lessons that should have been learned from
the U.S. experience in Vietnam, and the analysis of a large
sample of other relatively recent small (i.e., guerrilla) wars.
The value of the ideas or “rules” derived from this
experience lies in their utility as a conceptual framework
within which data from specific situations might be placed
and understood. If American and other leaders consider
these ideas not as a template, but, with serious intent, they
may be able to translate battlefield courage, logistical
superiority, and tactical victories into strategic successes in
the current and future asymmetric global security arena.

xiv

INTERNAL WARS:
RETHINKING PROBLEM AND RESPONSE

The end of the Cold War did not produce an end to
internal or regional conflict and the expected peace
dividend. Ethiopia, the Balkans, Sudan, Mexico, and the
Philippines are cases in point. As this monograph is being
written, over half the countries in the global community are
faced with one variation or another on guerrilla war.1
Insurgencies, internal wars, and other small-scale
contingencies, then, appear to be the most pervasive and
most likely type of conflict in the new world order. It is
almost certain that, sooner or later, the United States will
become involved in some of these small (i.e., guerrilla) wars.
It is also certain that the deplorable experience of Vietnam
distorts and blurs American thinking about guerrilla
insurgency. Yet, the post-Vietnam experiences in aiding
guerrillas in Afghanistan and helping to combat insurgents
in El Salvador demonstrate that the United States can
operate with or against guerrillas under diverse
circumstances and achieve important objectives.2
What we hear and see in the year 2001 is not
encouraging, however. Three examples should suffice to
make the point. First, the debate regarding the transition of
the armed forces into a viable instrument of U.S. national
power for now and into the 21st century centers on a
categorical need for X number of Army divisions, X number
of Navy ships, and X number of Air Force squadrons. We
also hear of the need to defend outer space and the need for a
missile shield to protect the United States and its allies.3
The questions unanswered in these debates are: “Why? For
what purposes? Against whom? And, how will these forces
be used to achieve a political end?” It would appear that the
civilian and military leaders avoiding these questions are
still expecting some equivalent of Soviet combined arms
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armies to come crashing into West Germany, or Iraqi armies
to again maneuver in the open desert.
In this connection, there appears to be no recognition of
the fact that the lessons of the Vietnam War, the Persian
Gulf War, and any of the hundreds of smaller conflicts that
have taken place over the past several years are not being
lost on the new political actors emerging into the
contemporary multipolar global security arena. Ironically,
strategies being developed to protect or further the interests
of a number of new players on the international scene are
inspired by the dual idea of evading and frustrating
superior conventional military force.4 The better a power
such as the United States becomes at the operational level of
conventional war, the more a potential opponent turns to
asymmetrical solutions.5 Ralph Peters warns us that in
current and future conflict, “Wise competitors . . . will seek
to shift the playing field away from conventional military
confrontations toward unconventional forms of assault . . .
Only the foolish will fight fair.”6
Third, U.S. policy tends to ignore the guerrilla threat in
general instability and specific counterdrug efforts.
Examples over the past several years from Thailand in
Southeast Asia to Colombia in South America demonstrate
that American advice, training, and equipment may be used
only against illegal drug traffickers. That has been a deadly
problem in a large number of lethal confrontations where it
is virtually impossible to distinguish armed opponents as
either insurgents or narcotraffickers—until after the fact,
and probably too late. The rationale behind the practice of
ignoring the guerrilla reality while confronting the illegal
narcotrafficker threat within the same operational
environment is that if the United States allows its advisors,
weaponry, and equipment to be used against guerrillas, the
country will slide down the slippery slope into another
Vietnam. Thus, “We are committed to maintaining a line
between counternarcotics and counterinsurgency.”7
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The primary implication here is that broad strategic
concerns have played little part in the debates as to what to
do with the billions of dollars allocated to national and
global security. The United States has faced security
problems on an ad hoc case by case and situation by
situation basis. The American experience in Vietnam
demonstrated that as far as logistics and operations were
concerned, the United States succeeded in everything it set
out to accomplish. At the height of the war, the Army was
able to move almost a million soldiers a year in and out of
Vietnam, feed them, cloth them, house them, supply them,
and sustain them in the field. This was an operational-level
task of enormous magnitude, and the U.S. logistical system
was adequate to that task.8 On the battlefield, the U.S.
armed forces were unbeatable. In engagement after
engagement—including the great Tet Offensive—the forces
of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army were
repeatedly defeated.9 Yet, in the end, the military prowess
of the United States did not prevail.
North Vietnam, not the United States, achieved its
strategic objectives and emerged victorious. How could the
United States have succeeded so well, but failed so
miserably? The answers to those questions focus on the
problem of ignoring fundamental strategic requirements
and approaching strategic issues with operational
solutions. That is the basis of this monograph. The purpose
is not to find fault or identify villains. It is to draw from the
lessons of the past to better prepare today’s civilian and
military leaders to meet the unconventional warfare
challenges that will almost certainly face the United States
and the rest of the global community in the future. As U.S.
Army (Retired) Colonel Harry Summers expressed it,
paraphrasing General Douglas MacArthur’s guidance to
the Army in 1935, the quintessential strategic lesson to be
learned from the Vietnam War (or any other conflict) is to
“bring to light those fundamental principles, and their
combinations and applications, which, in the past, have
been productive of success.”10
3

Thus, we clarify the most salient lessons of Vietnam.
These strategic-level lessons provide a short list of
fundamental rules for dealing with contemporary conflict.
Second, with this as background, we develop lessons from
several other guerrilla wars that have taken place since the
end of World War II. These complementary lessons from a
large sample of 69 additional cases demonstrate important
“intermediate” rules for playing in the contemporary global
security arena. Third, we examine the future of guerrilla
war. This examination includes an analysis of the signposts
along the road to the 21st century and concludes that the
hard-learned lessons of the past remain valid. Finally, we
outline two “advanced” structural rules for generating
strategic clarity and success in current and future conflict.
By coming to grips analytically with the most important
lessons or rules that dominate modern internal wars,
political and military leaders should be able to develop the
broad strategic vision necessary to maximize opportunities
in the current and future global chaos and to win a small
(i.e., guerrilla) war—not just the battles, but the war itself.
THE FUNDAMENTAL STRATEGIC LESSONS OF
VIETNAM: RELEARNING FROM THE THEORY
AND EXPERIENCE OF THE PAST
If the lessons of Vietnam teach anything, they teach the
need to go back to basics. Sun Tzu prophetically argues that,
“War is of vital importance to the State; the province of life
or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it
be thoroughly studied.”11 And Clausewitz reminds us that
“The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of
judgment that the statesman and commander have to make
is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are
embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it
into, something that is alien to its nature.”12 Determining
the nature of the conflict is thus “the first of all strategic
questions and the most comprehensive.”13
These dictums imply five highly interrelated and
reinforcing strategic-level lessons that should have been
4

learned from the American experience in Vietnam. They are
the need to (1) carefully examine and define the nature of a
given conflict; (2) fully understand the strategic
environment within which the conflict is taking place; (3)
determine the primary centers of gravity within that
strategic environment that must be attacked and defended;
(4) appreciate the “centrality of rectitude” in pursuing a
given strategy or in supporting a given (e.g.,
counterinsurgency) effort; and (5) examine these lessons as
a strategic whole. This last lesson takes us back to where we
began and is the foundational basis for success.
Understanding the Nature of the Conflict.
The most fundamental principle that American
leadership ignored in Vietnam was the need to understand
the kind of conflict it was getting into. Then, as the war
continued, civilian and military leaders tried to turn that
guerrilla war into “something that it was not.” As a
consequence, the failure to correctly define the nature of the
conflict provided an erroneous guiding basis to the
subsequent conduct of the war. That, in turn, sealed the
unsuccessful outcome of the war even as American troops
began arriving in Vietnam. The final result was the
exhaustion of the American army against a secondary
guerrilla force, and the ultimate failure of the military to
support the national policy of containment of communist
expansion.14
In the tradition of the American way of war, civilian and
military leaders thought that “kicking ass” and destroying
the enemy military force was the goal of policy. Military
violence was the principal tool.15 At the same time, because
a “limited war,” such as that in Vietnam, implied a
low-effort task unworthy of serious concern, it was
something to be conducted with complaisance. It thus
became a traditional war of attrition “writ small.”16 In that
limited war of attrition, 58,000 Americans and 3.6 million
Vietnamese died. In terms of total populations, 3.6 million
5

Vietnamese is proportionally equivalent to 27 million
Americans.
Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
observed that “there are some people to whom life is not the
same as to us, . . . we’d better understand that and write it
down.”17 That is perhaps true, but in the strategic context of
the Vietnam conflict, relative regard for life was not a
simple cultural issue. General Vo Nguyen Giap explained
unequivocally that the Vietnamese took those awful
casualties because they were involved in a national war of
liberation, and that the people participated enthusiastically
in the resistance and consented “to make every sacrifice for
its victory.”18
Many American military officers and civilian officials
complained that the war in Vietnam had been “won”
militarily but “lost” politically—as if these dimensions of the
conflict were not completely interdependent. In becoming
involved in a modern guerrilla conflict—something
relatively straight-forward such as that in Chechnya or
something more complex such as the Colombian crisis—an
actor is likely to be involved in a set of simultaneously
waged political-psychological wars within a general conflict.
In those terms, an actor will not be engaged only in a
military war. Rather, as one of Clausewitz’s translators,
Michael Howard, points out—operational and technical
military factors are in fact subordinate to the “forgotten”
political-social-psychological dimensions of contemporary
conflict. If the struggle is not conducted with skill and based
on a realistic understanding of the situation in question, “no
amount of operational expertise, logistical back-up, or
technical know-how could possibly help.”19
Thus, it is imperative that senior decisionmakers,
policymakers, and their staffs correctly identify the nature
of the conflict in which they are involved; determine the
central strategic problem and the primary political objective
associated with it; prioritize the others; and link policy,
strategy, force structure and equipment, and coordinated
6

political-economic-psychological-military campaign plans
to solving the central strategic problem. This linkage
encompasses Clausewitz’s “forgotten dimensions of
strategy” and what Sun Tzu indicates is the indirect
approach to conflict. 20 The idea is that there are
other—more effective—ways to “render the enemy
powerless” than to attack his military force.21 It follows that
a political-psychological-military effort would be a potent
combination of ways to control a conflict such as that
experienced against the Vietcong guerrillas in Vietnam.
Such a conceptual exercise may be difficult, but it is
absolutely necessary given the obvious alternative.
Understanding the Strategic Environment.
Another reason for the American defeat in Vietnam was
that U.S. leadership paid little or no attention to the
strategic environment within which the conflict was taking
place. Once the nature of the conflict has been defined, the
next step in the counterinsurgency war process is the full
consideration of the strategic situation—and the most
important threats implicit in it. That is, the conceptual
foundation from which to further develop a strategic vision
for the successful pursuit of the war. The primary
consequence of ignoring the strategic environment was
complete frustration on the part of leadership and troops
involved in the guerrilla war, and the American public at
home.22
What happened was that American and South
Vietnamese forces would conduct series after series of
highly effective military operations that devastated the
Vietcong infrastructure and continually forced them and
their North Vietnamese allies to withdraw from the
immediate battlefield. Yet, despite traditional defeat, the
insurgents and their allies kept coming back. They kept
coming back from different directions, and they were always
refreshed, resupplied, and rededicated. Eventually, of
course, they prevailed.23
7

Americans could not understand the tenacity and the
persistence of the Vietcong guerrillas or how the enemy
could keep coming back defeat after defeat. As a
consequence, analysts argue that the U.S. leadership did
not understand three crucial things. They didn’t
understand the enemy, they didn’t really know their allies,
and they ignored the geopolitical aspects of the general
security environment.24
Understanding the Enemy. First, American leaders did
not analyze the socio-political situation in Vietnam and did
not understand the implications of the fact that the
guerrilla war in which they were involved was only the
latest in a long series of wars of national liberation against
foreign invaders. Vietnamese guerrilla roots and mentality
were located in struggles against the Chinese, against
French colonialism, against the Japanese invaders during
World War II, against the French again from the end of the
Japanese occupation to the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu
in 1954, and, finally, against American “neocolonialism.” As
a result, the North Vietnamese and their South Vietnamese
guerrilla allies were involved in a total war for
independence. The will to overcome the foreign invaders
had been inculcated into generations of highly nationalistic
patriots for well over 100 years.25 General Giap summed up
the socio-political situation in the following terms:
The guiding principal of the people’s war was long-term
resistance and self-reliance. That inspired in the people and the
army a completely revolutionary spirit which instilled into the
whole people the will to overcome all difficulties, to endure all
privations, the spirit of a long resistance, of resistance to the
end.26

The Guerrilla Threat. Americans thought they were
fighting a limited war of attrition against a traditional
enemy—dressed in black pajamas. The threat the South
Vietnamese government and the United States had to deal
with was not a limited or a traditional one. Rather, the
Vietcong—dressed in their comical black pajamas—were
8

making unconventional preparations to take control of the
state.27
At the strategic level, the Vietcong focused its
primary—indirect—attack on the legitimacy of the corrupt
and American-dominated South Vietnamese government.
Aside from spectacular actions like the Tet Offensive and
shows of force to keep South Vietnamese and American
troops off-balance and frustrated, the main military effort
was that of “armed propaganda.” Operationally, the
guerrillas expanded political, military, and support
components and consolidated their position with the
“masses.” The purpose was to convince the people that the
Vietcong was the real power in the country, and that the
incumbent regime in Saigon was unwilling and unable to
perform its fundamental security and service functions.
Tactically, except for shows of force, the guerrillas operated
in relatively small units with political, psychological, and
military objectives—in that order. “Armed propaganda”
was conducted not to “win,” but to further discredit the
South Vietnamese government and the Americans. It was
also intended to give the country and the world the
impression that the Vietcong was more powerful that it
really was.28
Knowing Your Ally and the Associated Threat. Second,
U.S. leadership did not take the trouble to get to know their
allies. To be sure, some great friendships were generated
between many American and South Vietnamese military
and between some American and South Vietnamese
civilians. Nevertheless, American civilian and military
leadership did not understand that the struggle between
Vietcong challengers and the incumbent South Vietnamese
government was a struggle over the moral right to govern.
American leaders did not fully appreciate the psychologicalpolitical fact that the Vietcong focus was not so much on
soldiers and politicians as on social classes and groups.
Guerrilla attacks on the South Vietnamese government
were generally indirect and relied on societal grievances
such as political and economic injustice, racial and religious
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discrimination, and debilitating internal corruption and
unwelcome foreign domination.29
This is the essential nature of the threat from any
insurgent organization, and it is here that any response
must begin. A counterinsurgency effort that does not
respond to legitimate internal socio-political concerns and
deals only with enemy military capabilities is ultimately
destined to fail. In Clausewitzian terms, the military
instrument for success in war depends on the other two
elements of the “remarkable trinity”—that is, military
success depends on the perceived justice of the
government’s political objectives and the resultant popular
passions.30 The war in Vietnam is a case in point.
The Geo-strategic Environment and the Associated
Threat. Third, the thread that allows an insurgency to
develop, grow, and succeed is adequate freedom of action
over time and space. Guerrillas maintain their freedom of
action and movement through the establishment and
maintenance of remote base areas, sanctuaries, and supply
routes. At the same time, they establish and maintain
supporting infrastructure within a population.31 The Ho
Chi Minh Trail provides a good example of how the United
States failed to deal effectively with one geographical
element in the strategic environment and one of North
Vietnam’s most effective geo-strategic weapons. The trail
became a network of roads from North Vietnam through
“neutral” Laos and Cambodia into South Vietnam. General
Maxwell Taylor argues that, as early as 1961, he informed
President Kennedy that the Vietcong insurgents could not
be beaten as long as infiltration by means of the Ho Chi
Minh Trail remained unchecked.32 Tony Joes explains:
The failure both to close the Trail and to adopt an alternative
strategy that would have neutralized its effects also meant that
Hanoi could fight on interior lines, a tremendous advantage. It
meant that the enemy was free to invade South Vietnam
continuously: The NVA’s (North Vietnam Army’s) colossal 1972
Easter (Tet) Offensive would have been quite impossible
without the Laotian springboard. It meant that when hard
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pressed by allied forces, the enemy could simply retreat into
Laos or Cambodia. Thus the policies of the Johnson
administration made a lasting, or even a temporary, American
military victory impossible. And that fact, in turn, meant that
attrition . . . would take longer than key segments of the
American public would accept.33

Summary. The war in Vietnam was considered by
American leadership to be a “unique” problem and dealt
with on an ad hoc, piecemeal, and operational basis as each
separate crisis or issue arose.34 What was worse was that
the assumptions upon which U.S.—and, thus, South
Vietnamese—actions were based were not well-informed,
were erroneous, or were ignored. As a consequence of not
understanding the enemy, not knowing the entirety of the
South Vietnamese situation, and not dealing effectively
with the reality of the geo-strategic situation outside the
boundaries of Vietnam—and not responding appropriately
to the threats implicit within that strategic environment—
the counter-guerrilla war could not be won.
Centers of Gravity and Implications for a Strategy
of Success or Failure.
Another fundamental principle that U.S. leaders found
too difficult to address was that of attacking centers of
gravity.35 Theoretically and practically, it is necessary to
correctly determine and aggressively attack the primary
sources of a political actor’s physical, psychological, and
moral strength. These are the hubs of “all power and
movement on which everything depends.”36 And, as a result,
centers of gravity provide the basic architecture from which
to develop a viable ends, ways, and means strategy. Beyond
attacking the traditional enemy military formations and
some of their support structure, American leadership found
that it was easier to deal with tactical and operational-level
“nodes of vulnerability.”37 As a war of attrition dictates, an
unconscionable number of people were killed and hurt, but
the sources of Vietcong and North Vietnamese strength
were virtually unscathed.
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Michael Howard reminds us that an adequate response
must be essentially a strategic political-economic-socialpsychological-security effort. The most refined tactical
doctrine, operational expertise, and logistical backup that
are carried out by the optimum military or police structure
in pursuit of a policy that ignores the strategic whole—to
include the populace—will be irrelevant.38 It must also be
remembered that if one wants strategic clarity to optimize
effectiveness, one must precede tactical and operational
efforts with relevant policy direction—and an ends, ways,
and means strategy to achieve it.
The major implication of this situation is that the
primary centers of gravity defined in the guiding strategic
vision constitute a possible set of simultaneously waged
political-psychological-social-moral-military wars within a
general conflict. In becoming involved in a war such as that
in Vietnam, centers of gravity may change as the situation
changes and the so-called wars-within-the-war will also
change.39 Strategy, of necessity, will also change. As an
example, Clausewitz points of that:
In countries subject to domestic strife [such as Vietnam], the
center of gravity is generally the capital. In small countries that
rely on large ones [such as the United States for South Vietnam
and North Vietnam for the Vietcong], it is usually the army of
their protector. Among alliances, it lies in the community of
interest, and in popular uprisings, it is the personalities of the
leaders and public opinion. It is against these that our energies
should be directed . . . Not by taking things the easy way—using
superior strength to filch [some piece of territory] preferring the
security of this minor conquest to great success—but by
constantly seeking out the center of his power, by daring to win
all, will one really defeat the enemy.40

Summers provides some illustrations of the dynamism
of the centers of gravity in the later part of the Vietnam
conflict. After the Paris Accords of 1973, “one of the first
questions [the North Vietnamese] asked was whether the
center of gravity had shifted from the U.S-South
Vietnamese alliance to new centers of gravity—the
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destruction of the South Vietnamese armed forces and the
capture of Saigon.” 4 1 Once the North Vietnamese
determined that the alliance was indeed irrelevant,
preparations were begun that led to the defeat in detail of
the South Vietnamese army, the fall of Saigon, and the
unconditional capitulation of the South Vietnamese
government and the final unification of the country. Here
the center of gravity changed three times—from the
“community of interest” of the United States and South
Vietnam, to the classical enemy military force, to the capital
city.
A major implication here is the fact that centers of
gravity must be attacked—and defended. It is as important
for an attacker to take the necessary measures to defend his
own centers of gravity as it is for him to deal with his
opponent’s centers of gravity. Again, and in this context,
U.S. leadership failed to defend American public opinion
against the full-scale “propaganda war” that was conducted
by North Vietnam and its allies throughout the world.
American leadership failed to understand that the “streets
of Peoria” and the “halls of Congress” were decisive in
determining the outcome of the war thousands of miles
away in Vietnam.
It is important for senior leadership to remember that
each facet of conflict has its corresponding threat and center
of gravity. The basic problem is to reevaluate constantly the
principal threat and the proper order of priority for the
others. The secondary problem is to develop the capability to
apply long-term political, moral, psychological, and
economic resources—as well as military—against the
various centers of gravity that a guerrilla or other type of
war generates. Shrinking from these inevitable
requirements for success in contemporary conflict only
prolongs the struggle. Sun Tzu reminds us that, “. . . there
has never been a protracted war from which a country has
benefited.”42
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The Centrality of Rectitude and Moral Legitimacy.
A central principle that emerged out of the war in
Vietnam was that of rectitude or moral legitimacy. The
essential beginning of understanding the centrality of this
principle in pursuing the counterguerrilla strategy against
the Vietcong was to come to terms with the fact that the
conflict was conducted in an essentially political-moral
context. This umbrella concept focused on the moral right of
the South Vietnamese government to govern and
demonstrated that legitimacy constituted the central
strategic problem. It was the hub of all power and movement
on which virtually everything depended. Popular
perceptions of right and wrong, poverty, lack of upward
mobility, and corruption threatened the right—and the
ability—of the South Vietnamese regime to conduct the
business of the state. And, these popular perceptions were
key to the outcome of the conflict.43
The primary objective of the Vietcong was to destroy and
take control of the South Vietnamese government. By
transforming the emphasis of the war from the level of
military violence to the level of a struggle for moral
legitimacy, the guerrillas could strive for total objectives—
the overthrow of the government—instead of simply
attempting to obtain leverage and influence for “limited”
political, economic, or territorial objectives in the
traditional sense. Thus, the use of indirect moral force
permitted the Vietcong to engage in a secret and prolonged
war—striking at the government’s right to govern—while
appearing to the people to pursue altruistic purposes. In
these terms, this war was not an extension of politics. This
war was politics. Thus, because it was a zero-sum game in
which there would be only one winner, it was also a total
war.44
The major implication here is that to counter this
socio-political challenge, the government must first
recognize what is happening and then be willing to
acknowledge that its civil support is fragile and its control
14

over the populace contested. General John R. Galvin argues
that to establish its moral legitimacy, the government must
address contentious, long ignored, but popular issues tied to
key facets of national life—socio-political, economic,
educational, juridical—as well as engaging the guerrillas on
the battlefield.
The resulting burden on the military institution is large. Not
only must it subdue an armed adversary while attempting to
provide security to the civilian population, it must also avoid
inadvertently furthering the insurgents’ cause. If, for
example, the military’s actions in killing 50 guerrillas cause
200 previously uncommitted citizens to join the insurgent
cause, the use of force will have been counterproductive.45

Another set of implications is obvious. Every policy,
every program, and every action taken by a government—
and its external allies—involved in an internal war scenario
must contribute positively and directly to developing,
maintaining, and enhancing the ability and willingness of
that regime to control its territory and govern its people in
that territory with rectitude. This provides an umbrella of
moral legitimacy and is the prime lesson for vulnerable
governments in the coming decades.46
Indigenous and foreign allied leadership must realize
that the highest priority must be to strengthen and
legitimize the state. Thus, critical points about moral
legitimacy must be understood at three different levels.
First, regime legitimacy is the primary target of the
insurgents. Second, the regime and its allies must protect
and enhance moral legitimacy as the primary means by
which that regime might survive. Third, a besieged
government looking abroad for support against
guerrillas—or to deny support to guerrillas—must
understand that rectitude and legitimacy is a double-edged
moral issue that will either assist or constrain foreign
willingness and ability to become effectively involved.
Again, Sun Tzu reminds us that “Those who excel in war
first cultivate their own humanity and justice and maintain
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their laws and institutions. By these means they make their
governments invincible.”47
Looking at the Strategic Whole.
The fact that the U.S. armed forces were never defeated
on the Vietnam battlefield obscures another important fact
of that war. American tactical and operational successes
tend to dim the strategic defeat. Thus, there is a need to
examine the problems and lessons of Vietnam as a strategic
whole. This is the combination of fundamental principles
which in the past have been the basis of success. In these
terms, it is important to remember that success in any one
component of grand strategy cannot generate overall
success. Success only becomes a viable possibility when all
the components of a strategy form a logical conceptual
framework, architecture, or strategic paradigm within
which judgments, comparisons, and data may be given
meaning.
This reality takes us back to where we began. It takes us
to the question: “How could the United States have won all
the battles in Vietnam, but lose the war?” The answer is
straightforward. American leadership failed to apply the
fundamental principles of military theory and grand
strategy in that conflict. More specifically:
• The assessment of the nature of the conflict was
incorrect.
• The strategic environment within which the war was
taking place was misunderstood or ignored.
• The primary centers of gravity were not carefully or
continually assessed, prioritized, or considered in
nonmilitary (e.g., socio-political) terms.
• There was no appreciation of the centrality of rectitude
and moral legitimacy in supporting the counterguerrilla
effort.
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• These fundamental principles were not brought
together and put into a strategic paradigm through which to
understand and conduct the war.
The central unifying theme of these lessons is decisive. If
a country such as the United States wants efficiency and
effectiveness in a matter as crucial as war, the civil-military
leadership must concern itself with two things. Clearly, the
instruments of national power must be organized, trained,
and equipped within prescribed budgetary considerations.
But, those actions must be preceded with clear, holistic, and
logical policy direction—and the structure, roles, missions,
and strategy that will ensure the achievement of the
political ends established in that policy. This fundamental
“rule” is as valid for current and future conflict as it has been
in the past.
LESSONS FROM 69 POST-WORLD WAR II
INTERNAL WARS: “INTERMEDIATE” RULES FOR
PLAYING IN THE CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL
SECURITY ARENA
In the mid-1980s practitioners and academics deemed it
important to begin to face the so-called Vietnam syndrome
and try to understand the variables that make the
difference between wining and losing guerrilla wars. The
intent was to improve prospects for success in contemporary
and future internal conflict situations and to do a better job
of protecting and advancing U.S. national interests in the
developing global instability. One such effort, never widely
publicized, was initiated in 1984 by then-Vice Chief of Staff
of the U.S. Army General Maxwell Thurman. He mandated
the empirical examination of an initial sample of 43
(subsequently expanded to 69) internal wars that would (1)
allow the testing of competing theoretical approaches (i.e.,
strategic paradigms) to internal guerrilla conflicts; (2)
determine the extent to which the success or fail outcome of
such conflicts is predictable; and (3) generate a new
paradigm to improve prospects for success in future similar
situations.48
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The results of part of the mandated research were
published in 1992.49 There is nothing really startling or
radical about them. The results suggest basic security
strategy and national and international asset management.
The theoretical construct of the SWORD model suggests
that even though every conflict is situation specific, it is not
completely unique. Throughout the universe, there are
analytical commonalities at the strategic and high
operational levels. Seven dimensions (i.e., dependent
variables), each composed of multiple independent
variables, determine the success or failure of an internal
war. In essence, they may be considered “wars within the
general war.” In that connection, it should be emphasized
that the resultant paradigm has power and virtue in part
because of the symmetry of its application—both for a
besieged government and its allies, and for a violent
internal challenger and its allies. That is to say, no
successful strategy—on either side of the conflict
spectrum—has been formulated over the past 50 years that
has not explicitly or implicitly taken into account all the
following strategic dimensions—or wars within the general
internal war.
They are (1) a legitimacy “war” to attack or defend the
moral right of an incumbent regime to exist; (2) a more
traditional police-military “shooting war” between
belligerents: (3) “wars” to isolate belligerents from their
internal and external support; (4) the closely related “war to
stay the course”—that is, the effort to provide consistent
and long-term support to a host government; (5) intelligence
and information “wars”; and (6) “wars” to unify multidimensional, multilateral, and multiorganizational elements into
a single effective effort. It is important to note that the
application of these dynamic dimensions in a successful
strategy subsumes that a realistic strategic vision and
policy are based on the fundamental principles discussed in
the “Strategic Lessons of Vietnam” section above.
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The Legitimacy “War.”
The data show that the moral right of a regime to govern
is the most important single dimension in a counterguerrilla war. Thus, a politically strong and morally
legitimate government is vital to any winning internal war
strategy. The rectitude and legitimacy of the incumbent
regime is the primary target—the primary center of
gravity—as far as the insurgent organization is concerned.
In that connection, the interaction between an allied outside
power and the incumbent government, especially with
regard to the publicly perceived level of the “Americanization” of a conflict, is critical to success. A counterinsurgency campaign that fails to understand the lack of
rectitude and morally legitimate governance problem and
responds only to “enemy” military forces is very likely to
fail.50
As an example, leaders on both sides recognized early in
the conflict in El Salvador that this dimension would be key
to success or failure for the insurgents or the government.
Speaking for the insurgents, Guillermo M. Ungo identified
the legitimacy of the regimes as the primary center of
gravity in that situation.51 President Jose Napoleon Duarte
understood the problem and countered with a nationalistic
program designed to preempt the efforts of the Forabund
Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) guerrillas. His
argument was simple: “If the Christian Democrats
demonstrate in El Salvador that a democratic system can
bring about structured changes peacefully, then the
polarized choice between domination by the rightist
oligarchy and violent revolution by the Left will no longer be
valid.”52
The Shooting “War.”
Experience affirms that military force should not be
applied ad hoc in response to either political or military
failure, or in an attempt to “try something that might work.”
If military force must be inserted into a nationalistic milieu,
19

it should be done overwhelmingly at the outset.
Nevertheless, the data indicate that the best possible use of
“foreign” military personnel in an internal conflict is one
variation or another on the “train the trainer” role.
Accordingly, the “outside” forces that might be brought into
most counterguerrilla situations do not necessarily need the
skills required for success against combined arms armies on
the north German plain. What they do need is a high degree
of professionalism, the ability to insert themselves
unobtrusively into a nationalistic environment, and to help
build and equip an indigenous military force capable of
achieving political and psychological as well as policemilitary objectives. In this regard, it is important for that
security organization to have the mentality to engage
guerrillas without alienating the citizenry.53
Successful examples of this type of effort would include
U.S. Military Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) training the
first Cazador (Hunter) units of the Venezuelan Army into
superior organizations during 1961-64 and the Bolivian
Ranger units that destroyed Che Guevara’s guerrilla
organization in Bolivia in 1968. This approach did not
require many “foreign” troops; they were in relatively little
physical danger; and they kept a low political profile.54
The “Wars” to Isolate the Guerrillas.
The objective here is for a belligerent to isolate his
opponent politically, psychologically, and militarily from
his primary sources of support and sanctuaries—whoever
and wherever they may be. To ignore this dimension of
internal conflict as too difficult and too dangerous in its
domestic and foreign political-military ramifications is to
deny the possibility of ultimate success.55
This dimension is clearly demonstrated in virtually all
the 69 cases examined, but the classic example of this type of
war is Greece, 1946-49. In this case, the Greek insurgent
forces received logistical and other support from Greece’s
Communist neighbors—Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia.
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This support included food, clothing, arms, ammunition,
training, transit areas, replacement centers, field hospitals,
and supply depots. Countermeasures undertaken to control
those borders by the Greek government and the army failed
to have any significant effect on reducing the offensive
capabilities of the guerrillas. The Greek National Army was
only capable of pushing its insurgent enemies from one area
to another. In the north, the insurgents would simply move
into adjacent Communist territory and subsequently
reappear in another part of Greece. However, in the spring
of 1949, the Yugoslavian and other frontiers were closed to
the Communist guerrillas as a result of negotiations and
political decisions made in London, Moscow, and Belgrade.
Denial of the various external supporting facilities to the
insurgents made it only a matter of a short time before the
insurgency was brought under control.56
A more recent example of the isolation of belligerents
from internal sources of support is found in the Italian
“counterterrorism” case during the late 1970s and the early
1980s. The Red Brigades and the other 297 leftist groups
claiming responsibility for various terrorist and insurgent
acts were isolated from the rest of the Italian community as
a result of the effects of the legitimacy war, the intelligence
and information wars, and the paramilitary shooting war.
As the “terrorists” withdrew more and more into their own
compartmentalized secret organizational structure,
isolation from the rest of the world became more and more
complete. That separation from the outside world further
restricted access to the internal Italian political reality, the
capability to recruit new members, and the ability to
organize significant actions.57
The “War” to Stay the Course.
All support to a besieged government or, conversely, to a
supported violent internal guerrilla challenger, must be
consistent to be effective. Examination of the post-World
War II conflict spectrum clearly indicates that when
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military, economic, and/or political aid to a client was
withdrawn by an “ally” or coalition of allies during a conflict,
or when any of this support was provided inconsistently, the
possibilities for success in the general war were minimal.
The data indicate that when aid was provided consistently
over the long-term, chances for success in an internal war
were considerably enhanced. It must be remembered that
an important center of gravity lies in the “community of
interest” of the supporting ally(s) and the supported
government or insurgent organization. In these terms, what
happens politically and psychologically in capitals of the
world thousands of miles from a “war zone” may be more
decisive than any series of military engagements.58
A host of cases from the Algerian war, 1954-62; the
Vietnamese reunification, 1954-73; the El Salvadoran war,
1980-89; the Afghan war, 1979-89, to the current situation
in the former Yugoslavia provide examples of this
phenomenon. Nevertheless, in most of the cases in which
the British were involved, they managed to create the
perception that they were “there to stay” until the conflict
was clearly under control. This was the situation in Greece,
1946-49; Malaysia, 1948-60; and Oman, 1965-75, to
mention a few. This was not the case in Aden, however. In
1966 Britain announced its intention to withdraw its
security forces on the date when that country was to become
independent in 1968. Importantly, this meant that the
British would pull out of Aden regardless of the ability of the
new government to deal with the ongoing insurgency. As a
result, the intended government never really had a
chance.59
The Intelligence and Information Wars.
Individual men and women lead, plan, execute, and
support a given conflict. As a result, a major concern in an
internal war must be individuals. The intelligence
apparatus must be in place, or created, that can locate,
isolate, and neutralize an opposing belligerent’s
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organizational and leadership structure. The data
demonstrate clearly that the best police, paramilitary, or
military forces are of little consequence without appropriate
and timely intelligence. Likewise, willing support to the
state on the part of a majority of the populace, motivated by
legal, democratic, and honest informational actions on the
part of the government are directly related to the synergism
and effectiveness of a counterguerrilla war. In the final
analysis, legitimate long-term military and political power
depend on the proverbial “hearts and minds” of a people.60
The key role of effective—or ineffective—intelligence is
clearly demonstrated in the Cuban and Nicaraguan cases of
1956-59 and 1979, respectively. In these classic cases, the
intelligence organizations of the Batista and Samoza
regimes continued a “business as usual” attitude during the
insurgencies. That is, priority targets tended to be the
personal enemies and legitimate internal political
opposition of the two dictators. Because of the misdirected
effort and lack of concern for any kind of rectitude involving
citizens—innocent or not—the real motives of the Cuban
and Nicaraguan dictators came into focus. Consequently,
the sacrifices necessary to press a fight against insurgents
who promised serious reform were not readily forthcoming
from either citizen or soldier—and the key element of moral
legitimacy was totally subverted.61
A good example of an Information “War” against a
violent internal enemy is, again, found in the Italian case. In
that situation, the state and the media embarked on a
strong countersubversive public diplomacy campaign. The
objective was to expose and exploit the fact that the various
left-wing, right-wing, and separatist, pacifist, and other
subversive groups operating in Italy during the late 1970s
and the early 1980s were not organizations of the masses.
Rather, they were self-appointed elites whose goals were
not what the people wanted or needed—those goals were
what the insurgent leaderships wanted or needed. The
antisubversive information “war” demonstrated that, for
the Red Brigades and their allies, those Italians who were
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not fellow ideological “true believers” were not really people.
As an example, the thousands of victims killed, maimed, or
abducted by the would-be insurgents were not considered to
be human beings deserving of some personal dignity. They
were considered “tools of the system, pigs, and watch dogs.”
Moreover, the government and media exposed the fact that
Red Brigadists considered everyone else—even other
comrades on the Left—to be mere “shit.” Their legitimacy
was greatly eroded, supporters were obviously alienated,
and counterinsurgent intelligence was willingly provided.62
The “War” for Unity of Effort.
This dimension of counterguerrilla war involves
overcoming parochial bureaucratic interests, fighting “turf
battles,” overcoming cultural obstacles, and ensuring that
all efforts are centered on the ultimate goal—success. That
is to say, the necessary organization at the highest levels
must exist to coordinate and implement an effective unity of
political-diplomatic, socio-economic, psychological-moral,
and security-stability efforts against those who would
violently depose a government. Again, this applies equally
to an organization that threatens an incumbent regime. In
any case, the ability to accomplish these things in a manner
acceptable to the populace is key. And, that equates back to
legitimacy. Without an organization that can establish,
enforce, and continually refine a holistic plan and generate
consistent national and international support, authority is
fragmented and ineffective in resolving the myriad
problems endemic to survival in contemporary conflict—
thus, failure.63
Ambassador Robert Komer has pointed out that unity of
effort was a major deficiency in the Vietnam War.64 This
was also the case at the Bay of Pigs (Cuba) in 1961; Aden in
1968; and the Spanish experience in the Western Sahara in
1975-76. Others have observed that the “strategic
ambiguity” of the past United Nations (U.N.) and current
NATO efforts in the former Yugoslavia is also a result of a
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lack of national and international unity of effort. On the
positive side of the unity of effort dimension, with the
exception of the 1968 fiasco in Aden, British
counterinsurgency experiences seem to dominate. For
instance, an overall coordinator of all military and civil
activities has usually been appointed by the prime minister.
A committee of the cabinet provides periodic general
direction and support of this individual. The coordinator
has the authority to deal with people in his own government
and with officials in the threatened country. Together,
long-term and short-term mutually supportive objectives
are determined and pursued.65
THE FUTURE OF GUERRILLA WAR: SOME
SIGNPOSTS ON THE ROAD AHEAD
Even though prudent armies must prepare for high risk
low-probability conventional war, there is a high probability
that the President and Congress of the United States will
continue to require military participation in small internal
guerrilla wars well into the future.66 The harsh realities of
the new world disorder are caused by myriad destabilizers.
The causes include increasing poverty, human starvation,
widespread disease, and lack of political and socio-economic
justice. The consequences are seen in such forms as social
violence, criminal anarchy, refugee flows, illegal drug
trafficking and organized crime, extreme nationalism,
irredentism, religious fundamentalism, insurgency, ethnic
cleansing, and environmental devastation.
The Problem.
These destabilizing conditions tend to be exploited by
militant nationalists, militant reformers, militant religious
fundamentalists, ideologues, civil and military
bureaucrats, terrorists, insurgents, warlords, and rogue
states working to achieve their own narrow purposes. As a
result, the interdependent global community is
experiencing “wars of national debilitation, a steady run of
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uncivil wars sundering fragile but functioning nation states
and gnawing at the well-being of stable nations.”67 The
threats to national and international stability will be
gravely complicated by “l,000 other snakes with a
cause”68—and the will to resort to illegal and asymmetric
measures to achieve their nefarious objectives. In this
security environment, military and police forces have little
choice but to rethink security as it applies to guerrilla
menaces that many governments have tended to wish away.
The Challenge.
Guerrilla wars will likely have new names, new motives,
and new levels of violence that will be a new part of the old
problem. Nevertheless, whether they are called “teapot
wars,”69 “camouflaged wars,”70 “unrestricted wars,”71 or
something else, future guerrilla wars can be identified by
the lowest common denominator motive. And, as a corollary,
whether they are considered “spiritual” insurgencies,
“commercial”72 insurgencies, or anything else, guerrilla
wars are the organized application of violent or nonmilitary
coercion or threatened coercion intended to resist, oppose, or
overthrow an existing government, and to bring about
political change. 7 3 It is daunting, and sometimes
overwhelming, to think of the implications for guerrillas, or
other self-appointed saviors, who might employ nuclear,
chemical, biological, electronic, and informational weapons
to attain their objectives. The point remains, however, that
whatever it is called, whatever rationale justifies it,
whatever means it uses, guerrilla war is widely perceived as
an effective means of achieving power and influence.
In this context, every guerrilla war will be unique. It will
reflect the history, geography, and culture of the society in
which it occurs. Yet, there will be analytical commonalities—
and strategic-level principles—that continue to be relevant.
Ian Beckett is eloquent when he states that “The past of
guerrilla warfare and insurgency represents both the
shadow of things that have been and of those that will be.”74
26

The Reality.
Although present and future internal conflicts may have
different trappings, it is important to remember the
hard-learned lessons of the past. The continuing relevance
of relatively recent experience can be seen in the basic
elements that define threat and dictate response that are
derived from the SWORD model, and that can been seen in
ongoing conflicts.75
• Moral legitimacy remains the most important
principle of the post-World War II era. It can be seen, as
examples, in the Kurdish problem in Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and
Russia from at least 1961 to the present; Sierra Leone since
1991; the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria since 1992; and
in Chechnya since 1999.
• Appropriate use of military force is still a key element
in determining success or failure of counterguerrilla wars.
Importantly, the irrelevance of heavy Russian military
equipment and conventional training can been seen in the
Peruvian effort against the Sendero Luminoso, and in the
Ethiopian case.
• The logical need to isolate belligerents from sources of
support is obvious in any number of contemporary cases.
Two examples would include Colombia and Chechnya. In
Colombia, the alliance formed with narcotraffickers is
providing generous financial assistance in return for
protection of narcotics operations. In Chechnya—and
earlier in Afghanistan—the war against Russian
domination would be impossible without substantial
outside aid from state and nonstate political actors.
• In this connection, the need to “stay the course”
remains constant. Without outside aid and internal
support, the Irish Republican Army could not function
effectively in Northern Ireland. Likewise, the Middle
Eastern Kurds would be unable to carry on their wars for
national liberation.
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• Intelligence and information also remain vital to the
success or failure of contemporary guerrilla war.
Participants and observers argue, for example, that the
failure of the stability operations in Somalia was due in
large part to a failure of the United States and the U.N. to
develop adequate and timely human intelligence about
militia groups in that country. On the other hand,
information campaigns have been key to the success of the
Zapatista insurgency in Mexico.
• Unity of effort is the last principle that will be noted
here. Suffice it to say that the many problems of the U.N.
operation in the Congo (UNOC), the U.N. operation in
Somalia (UNOSOM II), the U.N. operations in the former
Yugoslavia, and the NATO operation in Kosovo stem from a
lack of unity of effort among the various military
contingents making up the specific force.
The Task.
Steve Metz and others have identified two
characteristics of asymmetric guerrilla threats that are
particularly important. First, defense planners today
cannot know precisely what sort of threats will emerge and
what types will prove effective. Second, the effectiveness of
asymmetric threats that have an impact will sooner or later
decline as an enemy adjusts. Metz argues that by
maximizing conceptual and organizational adaptability
and flexibility, the United States can assure that it will
rapidly counter emerging asymmetric threats, and speed
the process by which a guerrilla threat becomes
insignificant or ineffective. Phrased differently, in a time of
strategic fluidity and asymmetry like the current one, the
political actor that develops new concepts and concomitant
leader judgment—and unifying organizational structure—
better and more quickly than its opponents, will have a
decided advantage.76
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Conclusions.
Victory in any kind of war—including internal guerrilla
war—is not simply the sum of the battles won over the
course of a conflict. Rather, it is the product of connecting
and weighting the various elements of national power
within the context of strategic appraisals, strategic vision,
and strategic objectives. Sun Tzu warns us that “in war,
numbers alone confer no advantage. Do not advance relying
on sheer military power.”77 The promulgation of such a
concept requires a somewhat different approach to modern
conflict than that generally used by the United States over
the past several years.
The strategic paradigm outlined above acknowledges
the fact that the ultimate outcome of any counterinsurgency
effort is not primarily determined by the skillful
manipulation of violence in the many military battles that
take place once a war of this nature is recognized to have
begun. Rather, control of the situation is determined by the
level of moral legitimacy; organization for unity of effort;
type and consistency of support, intelligence and
information; the ability to reduce internal and external aid
to the insurgents; and the discipline and capabilities of the
security organization involved in the “shooting war.” To the
extent that these factors are strongly present in any given
strategy, they favor success. To the extent that any one
component of the model is absent, or only present in a weak
form, the probability of success is minimal.
TWO “ADVANCED” STRUCTURAL RULES FOR
SUCCESS IN THE GLOBAL SECURITY ARENA
The United States is embroiled in a world of dangerous
uncertainty in which time-honored concepts of national
security and the classical military means to attain it, while
still necessary, are no longer sufficient. In becoming
involved in modern conflict—relatively straightforward
guerrilla war as in Chechnya or something more complex
such as the Colombian crisis—a player is likely to be
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involved in a set of simultaneously waged politicalpsychological wars within a general conflict. In this world,
in which one or a dozen political actors are exerting differing
types and levels of power within a set of cross-cutting
alliances, the playing field, rules, and players are more
complex, and identifying the objectives of the game is more
perplexing.
The political-military complexity of contemporary
conflict requires the highest level of strategic thought and
exceptional civil-military and military-military diplomacy,
cooperation, and coordination. This issue dominates
insurgency and other internal wars at two levels—the need
to understand the nature of unconventional conflict, and the
high levels of cooperation needed to deal with it. The first
requirement pertains to the development of leader
judgment. The second imperative involves the organization
for unity of effort. Substantive changes in both the
leadership development and unity of effort areas of concern
require a carefully staffed, phased, and long-term
validation, planning, and implementation program. The
recommended basic direction for such efforts is outlined
below.
Leader Judgment.
The study of the fundamental nature of conflict has
always been the philosophical cornerstone for understanding conventional war. It is no less relevant to
nontraditional war. In the past, some wars—such as that in
Vietnam—tended to be unrealistically viewed as providing
military solutions to military problems. Presently, the
complex realities of these kinds of wars must be understood
as a holistic process that relies on various civilian and
military agencies and contingents working together in an
integrated fashion to achieve common political ends.78
Given today’s realities, failure to prepare adequately for
small war (i.e., guerrilla) contingencies in unconscionable.
At a minimum, there are eight basic educational and
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cultural imperatives to modify Cold War mind-sets and to
develop the leader judgment needed to deal effectively with
complex, politically dominated, multidimensional,
multiorganizational, multinational, and multicultural
internal war situations. They are:
• Concepts from “asymmetry,” “center of gravity,”
“deterrence,” and “enemy” to “victory” and “war” must be
reconsidered and redefined for intrastate conflict.
• Civilian and military leaders at all levels must learn
the fundamental nature of subversion and insurgency with
particular reference to the way in which force can be
employed to achieve political ends and the way in which
political considerations affect the use of force. In addition,
leaders need to understand the strategic and
political-psychological implications of operational and
tactical actions.
• Civilian and military leaders at all levels must learn
that power is not simply combat firepower directed at an
enemy military formation or industrial capacity. Power is
multilevel and combined “hard” and “soft” political,
psychological, moral, informational, economic, societal,
military, police, and civil bureaucratic activity that can be
brought to bear directly and indirectly within a given
security environment.
• Civilian and military personnel are expected to be able
to operate effectively and collegially in coalitions or
multinational contingents. They must also acquire the
ability to deal collegially with civilian populations, and local
and global media. As a consequence, efforts that enhance
interagency as well as international cultural awareness,
such as civilian and military exchange programs, language
training programs, and combined (multinational) exercises
must be revitalized and expanded.
• In that connection, planners and negotiators who will
operate at the strategic and high operational levels must be
nurtured to function in coalitional decisionmaking and
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planning situations that can blend U.S. deliberate planning
processes with concurrent multinational and multiorganizational practices. Additionally, there is a critical
requirement to teach people how to put a campaign plan
together using a combination of civil and military resources
to achieve a single comprehensive political aim.
• Leaders must learn that an intelligence capability
several steps beyond the usual is required for small internal
wars. This capability involves active utilization of
intelligence operations as a dominant element of both
strategy and tactics. Thus, commanders at all levels must be
responsible for collecting and exploiting timely intelligence.
The lowest echelon where adequate intelligence assets have
been generally concentrated is the division or brigade. Yet,
operations in small wars such as insurgencies are normally
conducted independently by battalion and smaller units.
• Civilian and military leaders must learn the totality of
guerrilla wars. These small, intrastate wars are not a kind
of appendage—a lesser or limited thing—to the more
comfortable conventional military paradigm. They are a
great deal more.
• Negotiations, agreements, and accords notwithstanding, guerrilla war is a zero-sum game in which there is
only one winner.
• Finally, leader development must prepare military
peacekeepers (i.e., peace enforcers) to be effective war
fighters. Political actors in an intrastate conflict are likely to
have at their disposal an awesome array of conventional
and unconventional weaponry. The “savage wars of peace”
have and will continue to put military forces and civilian
support contingents into harm’s way.
Unity of Effort.
Continuous and cooperative planning among and
between national and international civilian and military
organizations, beginning with a strategic assessment of the
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situation, can establish a mechanism for developing a
common vision for ultimate political success (i.e., strategic
clarity). Then, shared goals and objectives, a broad
understanding of what must be done or not done or changed,
and a common understanding of possibilities and
constraints will generate an overarching political military
campaign plan that becomes the basis for developing
subordinate plans that will make direct contributions to the
achievement of the desired political goals and objectives.
Thus, the roles and missions of the various civilian and
military elements evolve deliberately—rather than in
response to “mission creep”—as the situation changes to
accommodate progress toward the achievement of a
mutually agreed political vision.79
In these terms, operations will achieve strategic clarity
and maximum effectiveness as a result of integrating both
horizontal and vertical planning and implementation
processes from the outset. That is, integrating horizontal
(i.e., multinational) political-military planning and
operations with vertical national (e.g., U.S. interagency)
political-military planning and operations achieves a
synergy toward the achievement of an agreed political
vision. Two fundamental organizational mechanisms are
necessary to help eliminate “ad-hoc-ery” and to help ensure
vertical and horizontal unity of effort. They are:
• A national executive-level management structure that
can and will ensure continuous cooperative planning and
execution of policy among and between the relevant U.S.
civilian and military agencies (i.e., vertical coordination).
That organizational structure must also ensure that all
civil-military action at the operational and tactical levels
directly contributes to the achievement of an agreed U.S.
national strategic political vision.
• An ad hoc international executive-level management
structure that can—when necessary—integrate coalition
military, international organization, and nongovernmental
organization processes with American political-military
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planning and implementing processes (i.e., horizontal
coordination). That organization, too, must ensure that all
multilateral civil-military actions directly contribute to the
internationally agreed political vision.
Summary and Conclusions.
In sum, the lessons from over a half-century of bitter
experience suffered by governments involved in dealing
with guerrilla wars, and similar global destabilizers, show
that a given international intervention often ends short of
achieving the desired peace. Too often this is because short-,
mid-, and long-term objectives are irrelevant or unclear, the
“end-game” is undefined, consistent and appropriate
support is not provided, and national and international
civil-military unity of purpose remains unachieved. Thus,
despite acknowledged difficulties, it is imperative to
develop leaders and organizational structures that can
generate strategic clarity and make it work.
Even though every conflict situation differs in time,
place, and circumstance, none is ever truly unique.
Throughout the universe of contemporary guerrilla war,
there are salient analytical commonalities. The final
outcome of conflicts such as those in Vietnam or
Colombia—or the nearly 100 conflicts the U.N. Security
Council has recognized since 1990 as destabilizing
intrastate struggles—is not determined primarily by the
skillful manipulation of violence on the battlefield. Control
of the situation and its resolution are determined by the
qualitative leader judgments and the synergistic
organizational processes established before, during, and
after a small internal war is politically recognized to have
begun. These are the fundamental components of strategic
clarity. And strategic clarity is essential to success in the
new millennium.
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AFTERWORD
These are the lessons that should have been learned
from experience in 69 relatively recent small (i.e., guerrilla)
wars. The value of the ideas or rules derived from this
experience lies in their utility as a conceptual framework
within which data from specific situations might be placed
and understood. If U.S. and other leaders consider these
ideas not as a template, but with serious intent, they may be
able to translate battlefield courage, logistical superiority,
and tactical victories into strategic successes in the current
and future global security arena.
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